State v. Brown

── State v. Brown ── Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut Date: May 19, 2026 Author: Mullins Category: General ************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Brown STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES BROWN (SC 20964) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The shooting had occurred amid a fight between two rival groups with which the defendant and the victim, respectively, were affiliated. At trial, the clerk of the court informed the court that one of the jurors, Juror 7, had expressed concerns for her safety stemming from certain interactions with a trial attendee. After discussing the incident with counsel and canvassing both Juror 7, who denied having or expressing any such safety concerns, and the clerk, the court excused Juror 7 from the jury. The court then canvassed the remaining jurors. One of the remaining jurors, Juror 1, indicated that he had overheard Juror 7 raise safety concerns and that two other jurors, Jurors 3 and 6, had also overheard those concerns, but all of the other remaining jurors denied having or overhearing any conversations regarding concerns about the trial. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, contending that the canvass process itself made it impossible for the remaining jurors to be fair and impartial and that Jurors 1, 3 and 6 also should have been excused. The trial court denied that motion. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial and excusing only Juror 7 from the jury. The defendant was not entitled to a presumption, pursuant to Remmer v. United States (347 U.S. 227), that the allegedly improper interaction involv- ing Juror 7 was prejudicial. That presumption of prejudice applies only when some external interference with the jury’s deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors relates directly to the matter being tried. In the present case, the defense failed to demonstrate that the allegedly improper juror contact pertained directly to the merits of the matter rather than to the trial more topically. The only inference of interference or tampering that the defense adduced was that Juror 7 believed that one or more trial attendees watched her walk to her car, before or after one of those attendees commented on her coat, Juror 7 later denied ever having or expres