Commonwealth v. Hamza H. Abdo.

── Commonwealth v. Hamza H. Abdo. ── Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court Date: May 14, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT 25-P-643 COMMONWEALTH vs. HAMZA H. ABDO. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0 After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.1 On appeal the defendant challenges the empanelment of two jurors who, he contends, showed bias in favor of the police. The defendant further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on lost or destroyed exculpatory evidence. We affirm. 1The judge also found the defendant responsible for the civil infractions of speeding and possessing an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle.  1. Juror selection. During jury empanelment, defense counsel challenged juror no. 12 and juror no. 7 after the judge questioned each of them about whether they would believe the testimony of a police officer over that of a civilian.3 The judge declined to excuse either juror for cause, and both were empaneled.4 The defendant argues on appeal that this was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. After the judge posed questions to the venire, including whether they would "believe the testimony of a police officer over the testimony of a civilian witness just because that person is employed in law enforcement," the judge called juror no. 1 to sidebar. In response to further questioning, juror no. 1 stated that he would "believe in a police officer over a civilian" because police "know . . . the laws and stuff." When the judge explained that "the question is whether you think you 2 The defendant identifies this juror as juror no. 3, but the Commonwealth represents that the juror actually took the first seat. From our reading of the transcript, it appears that the Commonwealth is correct, so we will refer to the juror as juror no. 1. This discrepancy is not, in any event, material to our analysis. 3 The defendant challenged juror no. 7 for cause but raised only a general objection to juror no. 1. As the Commonwealth treats the objection as a challenge for cause, we will do likewise and assume the challenge was preserved. 4 The defendant later used his peremptory challenges on two other jurors. 2 can follow my instruction on assessing the police officer's credibility and testimony just like anybody else that testifies," juror no. 1 answered, "Right." The judge then asked directly, "Can you follow my instruction in deciding whether to believe the officer or not?" to which juror no. 1 answered, "Yeah." At this point the judge had juror no. 1 step back, and a discussion ensued between the judge and defense counsel. Although portions of that discussion are designated as inaudible, it appears that defense counsel raised an objection based on "some hesitation" in juror no. 1's answers. The judge overruled the objection, expressly stating that she "didn't