Franz Marx v. Patricia Brooks.

── Franz Marx v. Patricia Brooks. ── Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court Date: May 14, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT 25-P-334 FRANZ MARX vs. PATRICIA BROOKS. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0 We have seen this case, which we hope is nearing the end of litigation, before. See Marx v. Brooks, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2025) (Marx I). In very brief, this action involves events that occurred after dissolution of an approximately thirteen- year committed relationship between the parties during which they lived together. The Superior Court complaint in this matter was filed on May 10, 2018. The only count of relevance here was that for conversion. As a different panel of this court described in the previous decision, in 2019, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction that enjoined Brooks from "removing, selling or transferring the personalty of the plaintiff" from the home the parties previously shared and where Brooks continued to live. This order applied, among other things, to "a covered trailer, a Toyota, several car parts, and the shell of a Corvette." Marx I. In 2021, Brooks, in concert with her husband, "sold the trailer and the Toyota." Id. In a contempt action, this was found to amount to contempt of court. In addition, at Brooks's instruction, her husband "'moved many of the disputed car parts from a covered and protected environment, either in the covered trailer or in the garage, to the outdoor elements' and that the Corvette was moved from the garage to the yard." Marx I. The judge concluded that moving these disputed properties to an area where the elements would cause damage was also a violation of the preliminary injunction and in contempt of court. Appealing from the contempt judgment, Brooks argued that the term "removing" in the order was vague, and "she was not on notice that 'moving' the items outside would result in contempt." Marx I. A different panel of this court ultimately concluded that the judge was correct, and these actions, too, "clearly violated the preliminary injunction." Id. This appeal is from the judgment after a jury verdict against Brooks on the conversion claim. Brooks argues first that the judge erred in giving a jury instruction which stated: 2  "In June of 2019, this Court issued an order to both the plaintiff and the defendant that all of the personal property that was involved or in dispute in this case remained where it was at the . . . property, that the status quo as to the location of that property be maintained during the pendency of this lawsuit, which is ongoing to this date." She argues that the instruction was prejudicial because the term "status quo" was a mischaracterization of the order, in that the language of the order with respect to "removing" the property did not encompass her moving it from one location to another on her property. In her brief, which was filed after the rescript issued for Marx I,