Commonwealth v. David D. Mac Millan.

── Commonwealth v. David D. Mac Millan. ── Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court Date: May 18, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT 25-P-656 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID D. MAC MILLAN. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0 The defendant, David D. Mac Millan, appeals from a conviction, after a jury-waived trial in the Boston Municipal Court, of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). Concluding that evidence that the defendant was traveling at more than twice the speed limit on a busy street while showing significant signs of impairment established that his negligent driving might have endangered the lives or safety of the public, we affirm. "[W]e consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Lagotic, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 405, 407 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 216 (2019). "The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713, cert. denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014). "A conviction of negligent operation requires a showing that the defendant operated the vehicle 'negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered.'" Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021 (2019), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).1 "The statute only requires proof that the defendant's conduct might have endangered the safety of the public, not that it in fact did." Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007). Here, the trooper testified that the defendant was "[c]locked at 55 miles an hour" where the speed limit was "[t]wenty-five miles per hour."2 Although the trooper testified 1 The defendant properly does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the other elements of negligent operation. See Commonwealth v. Howe, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 357 (2023). There was sufficient evidence of operation on a public way. 2 The trial judge was entitled to credit the trooper's testimony regarding the speed limit over what the trooper stated that he wrote in the citation. See Commonwealth v. Coffman, 84 2 that there was "[l]ight traffic," the cruiser camera footage tells a different tale.3 In pursuit of the defendant, the cruiser encountered twelve other motor vehicles and five bicyclists on the bridge. Consistent with the trooper's testimony, the footage also reveals a number of pedestrians in the area. This case is controlled by Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921 (2004). There, as here, "the defendant's speed was not merely over the posted limit, but was more than twice that permitted on the road he was traveling." Id. at 922. There, the fact that the area wa