── Robinson v. Marshfield ──
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Date: May 15, 2026
Category: General
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SJC-13825
KEVIN C. ROBINSON vs. TOWN OF MARSHFIELD.
Plymouth. January 7, 2026. – May 15, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Dewar,
& Wolohojian, JJ.
Fire Fighter. Municipal Corporations, Fire department.
Employment, Retaliation. Anti-Discrimination Law,
Employment, Burden of proof, Damages. Evidence, Motive.
Damages, Under anti-discrimination law, Remittitur,
Punitive. Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, Special
questions to jury, Damages, Judgment notwithstanding
verdict, New trial. Jury and Jurors.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
March 13, 2020.
The case was tried before Gregg J. Pasquale, J., and a
motion for posttrial relief was heard by him.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Jason W. Crotty (John J. Davis also present) for the
defendant.
Anne Glennon (Marisa A. Campagna also present) for the
plaintiff.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
J. Lynn Milinazzo-Gaudet & Deirdre A. Hosler for
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.
2
Aaron A. Spacone & Catherine M. Scott for Massachusetts
Defense Lawyers Association, Inc.
Emma Quinn-Judge & Noah Gillen for Massachusetts Employment
Lawyers Association.
KAFKER, J. The plaintiff, Kevin C. Robinson, sued his
employer, the town of Marshfield (town), alleging retaliation in
violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4). Robinson was chief of the
town's fire department (department), and he alleged that the
town retaliated against him for complaining that his niece, who
was also a firefighter in the department, was being
discriminated against because of her gender. After trial, a
jury found the town liable for retaliation and awarded Robinson
compensatory and punitive damages. The town moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) or, in the
alternative, for a new trial or remittitur of the verdict. The
motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motion.
The town appealed, and we transferred the case sua sponte.
On appeal, the town claims that the judge erred in denying
its motion for judgment n.o.v. because the evidence was
insufficient to find that the town retaliated against Robinson.
The town also asserts that a new trial is required because the
judge improperly instructed the jury by blending pretext and
mixed-motive instructions.1
1 Robinson has cross-appealed, arguing that, with respect to
his retaliation claim, summary judgment should not have been
3
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to find that the town retaliated against Robinson because he
complained of gender discrimination. We also conclude that the
judge's jury instructions, as he recognized in his judgment
n.o.v. decision, included some blending of pretext and mixed-
motive language, even though this case should have been governed
by the pretext framework alone. Nonetheless, like the judge, we
ultimately conclude these errors were not prejudicial because
the instructions as a whole were adequate and the jury's answers
to the special verdict questions -- and particularly the jury's
award of punitive damages, which required a finding that the
town's conduct was extreme and outrageous -- leave no