SEC v. Barton

── SEC v. Barton ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Date: May 18, 2026 Category: United States Civil Case: 25-10871 Document: 104-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/18/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 25-10871 FILED May 18, 2026 Summary Calendar ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Timothy Barton, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:22-CV-2118 ______________________________ Before Richman, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Timothy Barton, proceeding pro se, appeals a midstream administrative order entered in an ongoing receivership. This is one of many appeals Barton has filed concerning this receivership. Because Barton has not established appellate jurisdiction, we DISMISS his interlocutory appeal and do not reach the merits. And given both the obvious jurisdictional defect and _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-10871 Document: 104-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/18/2026 No. 25-10871 Barton’s repeated receivership-related appeals, we DIRECT Barton to SHOW CAUSE why sanctions should not be imposed. I. JURISDICTION Federal appellate jurisdiction generally extends only to “final decisions” of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Final decisions are those that “end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Netsphere, Inc. v. Barton, 799 F.3d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). There are, however, exceptions to the final-judgment rule, two of which are relevant here. The first exception covers orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The second covers “orders appointing receivers, or refusing to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property.” Id. § 1292(a)(2). We first consider whether § 1291 allows us to reach the merits of Barton’s appeal. It does not. Barton contends that the modified receivership order is a “final decision.” But the order he challenges did not end the litigation. See Netsphere, 799 F.3d at 331. Nor did it leave only execution of the judgment. Id. Rather, the district court merely modified the existing receivership order to require that Barton pre-clear grievances and complaints. That is an administrative measure designed to prevent both interference with the receivership and harassment of the receiver. Because the “underlying . . . dispute that formed the original basis for th[e] litigation remains undecided,” there is no final decision that confers jurisdiction under § 1291. Id. Barton next argues that § 1292(a)(1) supplies jurisdiction because the district court’s pre-clearance requirement operates as a “freestanding injunction” that restrains his conduct. But an