State v. Foster

── State v. Foster ── Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon Date: May 13, 2026 Author: Aoyagi Category: General 446 May 13, 2026 No. 401 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEPHANIE MARIA FOSTER, aka Stephanie Foster, Defendant-Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 23CR37103; A185652 Robert B. Johnson, Judge. Submitted April 7, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Joel C. Duran, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Supplemental judgment reversed; remanded for resen- tencing; otherwise affirmed. Cite as 349 Or App 446 (2026) 447 448 State v. Foster AOYAGI, P. J. Defendant was convicted of first-degree theft, ORS 164.055(1)(a), and ordered to pay restitution as part of her sentence. See ORS 164.055(1)(a) (defining first-degree theft to include the theft of property with a total value of $1,000 or more). On appeal, she challenges the amount of the resti- tution award, specifically that it includes “$1,417.50 in res- titution for services.” We review for errors of law. State v. McClelland, 278 Or App 138, 141, 372 P3d 614, rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016). Defendant’s claim of error is well taken, and, accordingly, we reverse and remand. The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant took her car—a 2008 Audi—to an automotive shop for repairs. The shop did the repairs and presented defendant with a bill that included $3,143.92 for parts, $1,417.50 for labor, and $347.97 for other items. The shop intended to hold onto the car until defendant paid at least part of the repair bill, but defendant returned to the shop later with her spare key and took her car, without having paid any of the bill. Defendant was charged with theft of services, ORS 164.125, for unlawfully obtaining services available only for compen- sation without the intent to pay for them by use of deception (Count 1), and first degree-theft, ORS 164.055, for stealing automotive parts (Count 2). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to Count 2, and Count 1 was dismissed. The trial court scheduled a hearing to determine restitution. At the hearing, the state requested restitution to the automotive shop in the full amount of the repair bill. Defendant countered, as relevant here, that it would be improper to include $1,417.50 for labor costs in the restitu- tion award when she “wasn’t convicted of theft of services.” The state rejoined that the entire bill “could be appropri- ately assigned to either count” as economic damages result- ing from defendant’s conduct. Without stating its reasoning, the trial court ordered defendant to pay the full amount of the repair bill as restitution to the automotive shop. On appeal, defendant again challenges the inclusion of $1,417.50 for labor in the restitution award. She argues Cite as 349 Or App 446 (2026) 449 that she was not convicted of theft of services, nor did she admit to theft of services, and that this is not a situation in which the value of the shop’s services can be viewed as eco- nomic damages flowing from her theft of property. The state responds that defendant’s theft of the automotive parts fac- tually and foreseeably caused the automotive shop’s “losses for the labor expended to install the parts.” The state fur- ther argues that “the cost of services was inseparable from her theft of the property because the labor rendered defen- dant’s car usable allowing her to drive the car away from the shop to complete