Kendal Lawrence v. State

── Kendal Lawrence v. State ── Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia Date: May 15, 2026 Category: General FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules May 15, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0555. LAWRENCE v. THE STATE. MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge. After a jury trial, Kendal Lawrence was convicted of rape and other offenses. He appeals, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. But he has failed to show that the exclusion of evidence was reversible error or that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. So we affirm. 1. Facts and procedural posture Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence presented at trial showed that Lawrence and the victim lived together. On the date in question, Lawrence dragged the victim by her hair, slapped her face with his hands, choked her, threw her to the ground, beat her head on the floor, detained her with handcuffs, yanked off her pants, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. A medical examination of the victim revealed injuries consistent with the reported sexual assault. When Lawrence was later arrested, police found methamphetamine on his person. The jury found Lawrence guilty of the charged offenses of rape, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, family violence battery, and possession of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed a life sentence, with 30 years to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. Lawrence moved for a new trial, challenging, among other things, the effectiveness of his trial counsel and the exclusion of evidence about prior sexual relations between Lawrence and the victim. After a hearing at which Lawrence’s trial counsel testified, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. This appeal followed. 2. OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2) Lawrence enumerates that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of prior “rough sex” between him and the victim that was admissible under OCGA § 24- 2 4-412 (b) (2). But Lawrence failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for seeking to introduce such evidence. Under Georgia’s rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412, “evidence of a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior may not be introduced by any party at a trial involving a prosecution for certain sexual crimes unless such evidence falls under [a] specific exception contained in the statute itself.” White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 115 (1) (823 SE2d 794) (2019). OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2) contains such an exception, “provid[ing] that the trial court may admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct with the defendant if this evidence supports an inference that the defendant could have reasonably believed that the victim consented [to the conduct alleged in the prosecution].” Alvarez v. State, 378 Ga. App. 235, 243 (2) (925 SE2d 210) (2026) (punctuation omitted). Such evidence may be admitted by “following the procedure described in subsection (c) of [the rape-shield statute.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (b). Under the procedure set forth in subsection (c), if a party intends to offer such evidence, “the party must: (A) File a motion that specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for which it is to be offered; and (B) Do so at least three days before trial 3 unless the court, for good cause, sets a different date[.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) (1) (emphasis supplied). Lawrence has not