Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. World Wide
── Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. World Wide ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date: May 15, 2026
Category: General
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE No. 25-2381
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 631 SECURITY D.C. No.
FUND FOR SOUTHERN NEVADA; 2:23-cv-01469-CDS-DJA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
TEAMSTERS CONVENTION
INDUSTRY TRAINING FUND, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
WORLD WIDE EXHIBITS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Cristina D. Silva, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 11, 2026**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: BENNETT and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and HOLCOMB, District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable John W. Holcomb, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
World Wide Exhibits, Inc. appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to
set aside a default judgment. The district court granted default judgment for the
Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada
and the Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Convention Industry Training Fund
(“Plaintiffs”), who claimed that World Wide failed to make records available for
audit in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1145 and World Wide’s obligations under the
parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to set aside a default
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015). That review
entails a two-step test: “The first step of our abuse of discretion test is to determine
de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief
requested. The second step is . . . to determine whether the trial court’s application
of the correct legal standard was (1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without
‘support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” Id.
(citation modified) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
1. The district court identified the correct legal rule governing motions to
set aside the default judgment. A court may set aside a default judgment for
2 25-2381
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b). Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)). When a defendant seeks relief under Rule
60(b), “a court must consider three factors: (1) whether the party seeking to set
aside the default engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether it
had no meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would
prejudice the other party.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Signed
Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010)).
“This standard is disjunctive, such that a finding that any one of these factors is
true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to set aside the default.” Id.
(citation modified) (quoting Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091).
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}