Ocean S. v. County of Los Angeles

── Ocean S. v. County of Los Angeles ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 15, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCEAN S.; JACKSON K.; ROSIE S.; No. 25-1354 ERYKAH B.; JUNIOR R.; ONYX G.; D.C. No. MONAIE T., individually and on behalf of 2:23-cv-06921-JAK-E all others similarly situated, MEMORANDUM* Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES; LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, Defendants - Appellants, and CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, Doctor MARK GHALY, Secretary of the California Health and Human Services Agency, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, KIM JOHNSON, Director of the California Department of Social Services, MICHELLE BAASS, CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, CDSS Director * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. JENNIFER TROIA, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 19, 2025 Pasadena, California Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs in this case are a putative class of foster youth in Los Angeles County between the ages of 16 and 21, also referred to as “transition age foster youth.” They allege that the County’s foster care system has denied them “meaningful access to [] crucial housing, mental health, and other services to which they are legally entitled.” Among other things, Plaintiffs argue that there are too few foster placements, that the placements are arbitrary, and that certain health services are unavailable, all in violation of the Constitution and various federal laws. Defendants appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit presents questions from which federal courts ought to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution because their alleged injuries are not 2 25-1354 redressable. A district court’s decisions on standing and Younger abstention are reviewed de novo. See Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009). Although denial of a motion to dismiss is a non-final order generally not subject to appeal, a permissive interlocutory appeal is allowed when a non-final order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and when “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That is the case here. The district court certified its denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for immediate appeal, and this court granted permission to appeal. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction, and we affirm in part and dismiss in part. 1. Younger abstention is not warranted in this case. Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). As such, “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the ru