Stringer v. United States

── Stringer v. United States ── Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals Date: April 30, 2026 Category: General Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 24-CO-0163 BARRY D. STRINGER, APPELLANT, V. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2005-FEL-004970) (Hon. Julie H. Becker, Motions Judge) (Argued December 11, 2025 Decided April 30, 2026) Gregory M. Lipper for appellant. David P. Saybolt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Edward R. Martin, Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nihar R. Mohanty, and Caroline R. Burrell, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before DEAHL, HOWARD, and SHANKER, Associate Judges. SHANKER, Associate Judge: This post-conviction matter relates back to the murder of Tilford Johnson in 2003. Appellant Barry D. Stringer and his nephew Roderick Charles were charged with the murder and related offenses and tried separately. Both men were convicted in 2006 of armed robbery, first-degree felony  2 murder while armed, and several related offenses. We affirmed Mr. Stringer’s and Mr. Charles’s convictions on direct appeal but remanded in both cases for resentencing on merged offenses. Mr. Charles was resentenced in October 2014 to 372 months of imprisonment; Mr. Stringer was resentenced in January 2021 to 432 months of imprisonment. In 2014, based on new evidence, Mr. Stringer moved under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), D.C. Code § 22-4131 et seq., for vacatur of his convictions and dismissal of the charges or a new trial. The new evidence consisted of an affidavit by Mr. Charles in which he claimed that he had acted alone in killing Mr. Johnson and that Mr. Stringer was not involved. Following an evidentiary hearing in 2018 that included testimony from Mr. Charles, the trial court denied Mr. Stringer’s motion on the ground that Mr. Charles was not credible. Mr. Stringer appealed, arguing that the trial court clearly erred in discrediting Mr. Charles. Because we were “uncertain about the bases for some of the court’s findings and conclusions,” we remanded the case for reconsideration. Stringer v. United States, 301 A.3d 1218, 1220 (D.C. 2023) (Stringer I). On remand, the trial court again declined to credit Mr. Charles’s testimony, relying on “two critical facts”: first, that Mr. Charles’s testimony could not be reconciled with the physical evidence at trial, and second, that a letter Mr. Stringer  3 wrote to Mr. Charles when they were in jail supported the conclusion that the two men committed the crime together, undermining Mr. Charles’s claim that he acted alone and that Mr. Stringer was innocent. Mr. Stringer now appeals a second time, asking us to reverse because the trial court’s credibility determination was premised on clear error and a failure to adequately scrutinize the evidence at trial. We agree that the trial court erred, but we conclude that another remand, rather than reversal, is appropriate. We cast no doubt on the principle that the ultimate responsibility to determine a witness’s credibility and whether an IPA movant is more likely than not actually innocent lies with the trial court. But we are compelled to again say that a trial court’s factual findings, including its credibility determinations, cannot rest on unsupported speculation or a manifest misunderstanding of