Barlow, Jr. v. District of Columbia

── Barlow, Jr. v. District of Columbia ── Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals Date: May 14, 2026 Category: General Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 24-TX-0500 MILTON A. BARLOW, JR., APPELLANT, V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2022-CVT-000740) (Laura A. Cordero, Judge) (Argued November 12, 2025 Decided May 14, 2026) Kerry J. Davidson for appellant. Thais-Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee. Before BECKWITH and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, Senior Judge. BECKWITH, Associate Judge: Milton A. Barlow, Jr., was the primary beneficiary of a trust established to benefit him as well as his relatives. The trustee, Austin Trust Company (ATC), purchased a residential property in the District of Columbia on behalf of the trust and paid taxes on the property at the time of  2 purchase. Fourteen years later, the trust was dissolved and ATC deeded the property to Mr. Barlow. Although Mr. Barlow initially paid taxes on this property transfer and the recordation of the deed, he now seeks a refund, arguing that his deed is exempt from these taxes under District law. Because the tax exemptions Mr. Barlow cites—the statutory tax exemptions for “[s]upplemental deeds,” D.C. Code §§ 42-1101(15), 42-1102(6), 47-902(8), and the tax exemptions provided by District regulations, 9 D.C.M.R. §§ 509.1, 609.1—do not apply here, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the District. I. Background Mr. Barlow’s father (the settlor) created an irrevocable trust—a trust that requires the settlor to cede nonfiduciary control of the property in the trust—for the primary benefit of Mr. Barlow. See generally Amy Morris Hess et al., Bogert’s The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 234 (3d ed. May 2025 update) [hereinafter Bogert]; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63 cmt. c(1) (A.L.I. 2003). The trust agreement granted the trustee, later designated as ATC, “the widest latitude in the exercise of [its] powers,” including selling trust property and managing that real property as if it “were the absolute owner[] thereof.” 1 The trust agreement also designated the 1 Without deciding, we assume, like the litigants do, that the trust agreement and the trust should be construed according to District law.  3 settlor’s wife and Mr. Barlow’s siblings as secondary beneficiaries who were eligible for disbursements from the trust at ATC’s discretion. In 2007, at Mr. Barlow’s direction, ATC purchased and recorded a deed to the property at the center of this dispute. Soon after, the trust paid $31,029.98 in transfer and recordation taxes to the District of Columbia. ATC was the record owner of the property for fourteen years until 2021 when the trust was dissolved and the property was transferred for no consideration to Mr. Barlow, who executed and recorded his deed to the property. Mr. Barlow paid transfer and recordation taxes to the District in the amount of $53,181.36. Mr. Barlow then sought a refund for the taxes, arguing that his deed was exempt under District law. The Office of Tax and Revenue (OTR) denied his claim, stating in relevant part that his deed