Marcus Roland Maye v. State of Florida

── Marcus Roland Maye v. State of Florida ── Court: Supreme Court of Florida Date: May 14, 2026 Category: General Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2023-1184 ____________ MARCUS ROLAND MAYE, Petitioner, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. May 14, 2026 FRANCIS, J. Marcus Roland Maye, a prisoner serving a minimum mandatory life sentence 1 under Florida’s Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2002), 2 challenged the constitutionality of the PRR statute’s procedures by 1. Maye committed robbery with a deadly weapon in May 2002. 2. See § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2002) (“ ‘Prison releasee reoffender’ means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . [a qualifying offense, including robbery] . . . within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections . . . following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.”). filing a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence in circuit court. In his motion, Maye argued that the PRR statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied under Apprendi3 and its progeny, Alleyne,4 because under the statute’s language, a judge rather than a jury makes the finding exposing a defendant to a minimum mandatory sentence. See § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (providing that once the “state attorney determines that a defendant is a [PRR] . . . the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a [PRR]” based on proof meeting a preponderance of the evidence (emphasis added)). The State opposed the motion on two grounds, arguing, first, that rule 3.800(a) is not the proper vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of a statute, and, second, that binding district 3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that, except for the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the sentence for an offense beyond the statutory maximum is an “element” of the offense that must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt). 4. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (extending Apprendi to any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for an offense). -2- court precedent required the denial of Maye’s constitutional claim on the merits. Recognizing that binding precedent 5 held section 775.082(9) to be constitutionally valid, the circuit court denied Maye’s motion, and the Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed on this basis. See Maye v. State, 368 So. 3d 531, 532 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023). We approve the result of the Sixth District’s decision6 and hold that rule 3.800(a) is not the proper vehicle for raising a claim of error under Apprendi and its progeny, including Alleyne (“Apprendi claims”). 7 In so holding, we recede from Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2014), and its contrary holding that an Apprendi claim is cognizable under rule 3.800(a). 5. See Simmons v. State, 332 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). In 2023, the Sixth District came into being, and Maye’s appeal was transferred from the Fifth District Court of Appeal to the Sixth District. 6. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 7. “Whether a claim of error may be raised in a motion to correct illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a) is a pure question of law subject to de novo review.” Martinez v. State, 211 So. 3d 989, 991 n.4 (Fla. 2017) (citing Saintelien v. State, 990 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 2008)). -3-  I A Rule 3.800(a)(1) provides an extraordinary remedy that permits a challenge to either (