Peo v. Gray

── Peo v. Gray ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: May 14, 2026 Category: General 24CA2177 Peo v Gray 05-14-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA2177 Larimer County District Court No. 15CR926 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric David Gray, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez*, and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellee Eric David Gray, Pro Se *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Eric David Gray appeals the district court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 The prosecution charged Gray with first degree murder after he shot and killed a neighboring landowner, Gerald Donovan. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Gray and Donovan had been engaged in a longstanding property dispute, and the two had argued on the day of the shooting because Gray’s trailer was parked partially in the road. Gray entered his house to retrieve a rifle, and when Donovan walked onto Gray’s driveway, Gray shot him. ¶3 Gray put forth a hybrid theory of defense. He argued that he did not form the requisite mental state for first degree murder because he was experiencing persecutory delusions and paranoia and genuinely feared that Donovan had a gun — thus, in his mind, he was acting in self-defense. He called several experts who testified that he indeed had a mental illness that caused delusions and paranoia. The jury was instructed on self-defense as well as the elements of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter. It found Gray guilty of first degree murder. 1 ¶4 Gray appealed the judgment of conviction, challenging the trial court’s rejection of five tendered jury instructions and two of its evidentiary rulings. A division of this court affirmed. People v. Gray, (Colo. App. No. 18CA2432, July 28, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). ¶5 Gray timely filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion raising twenty claims. The postconviction court appointed counsel to supplement the motion and ordered the prosecution to respond. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, including their attached exhibits, the court denied Gray’s motion in a lengthy written order without granting a hearing. II. Discussion ¶6 Acting pro se, Gray appeals the postconviction court’s ruling as to seven of his claims. He contends that the district court erred by denying his motion and not holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. A. Standard of Review ¶7 We review de novo a postconviction court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. See People v. Marquez, 2020 COA 170M, ¶ 17. When a court determines that a pro se motion is not 2  wholly unfounded, appoints counsel, and orders a response from the prosecution, it may deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing if, “‘based on the pleadings,’ it is appropriate to enter a ruling without holding a hearing.” People v. Martinez, 2026 COA 7, ¶ 10 (quoting Crim P. 35(c)(3)(V)); see People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶ 4. ¶8 We may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any ground supported by the record. People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7. B. Successive Claims ¶9 First, Gray claimed that he is entitled to postconviction relief because (1) the jurors could not hear