Menchu v. Multnomah County Health Department

── Menchu v. Multnomah County Health Department ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 13, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JERRY ALEXANDER MENCHU, No. 24-5902 D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00559-AR Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Amy M. Baggio, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 22, 2026** Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges. Jerry Alexander Menchu appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action alleging violations of Title VI, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Oregon state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291. We review de novo. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Menchu’s discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law, because Menchu failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant took any adverse employment action against him because of his race or national origin, rather than because of its nondiscriminatory reasons. See Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth burden shifting framework for discrimination claims under Title VII and Oregon state law); Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the same framework applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Menchu’s retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law, because Menchu failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant took any adverse employment action because of retaliation, rather than because of its nondiscriminatory reasons. See Dawson, 630 F.3d at 936 (setting forth burden shifting framework for retaliation claims under Title VII and Oregon state law); Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1107-08 (explaining that the same standard applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims). 2 24-5902  The district court properly granted summary judgment on Menchu’s Title VI claim because Menchu failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant discriminated against him, and because Menchu may not bring a claim on behalf of patients in defendant’s clinics. See Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the same legal framework applies to Title VI and Title VII disparate treatment claims); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the plaintiff could not bring a Title VI claim on behalf of third parties), overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court properly declined to consider Menchu’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) claim because this claim was raised for the first time in his opposition to summary judgment. See Echlin v. PeaceHealth, 887 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot add new