Jane Doe v. East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

── Jane Doe v. East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: May 13, 2026 Category: General UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1875 JANE DOE v. EAST STROUDSBURG UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; VICTOR JASEI SAMU BURNS, Resi- dent Advisor; DR. MARCIA G. WELSH, University President; MARIA Z. CUTSINGER, Di- rector of Student Conduct and Community Standards; DR. DOREEN TOBIN, Vice Presi- dent for Student Affairs; ALLEN K. WILLIAMS, Assistant to the Vice President of Student Affairs; CORNELIA SEWELL-ALLEN, Dean of Student Life; WILLIAM PARRISH, Chief of University Police; LYESHA J. FLEMING, Resident Director; JEAN MAKENLEY, Resident Assistant; JOHN DOE(S), Supervisors to Resident Directors and Advisors, Appellants ______________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, No. 3:22-cv-01690 Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. Argued February 3, 2026; Filed May 13, 2026 ______________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. When “Congress has enacted no statute of limitations for a federal tort, [federal courts] ordinarily borrow the statute of limitations from state law.” Fisher v. Hol- lingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2024). For the federal claims at issue in this action, that includes “the general or residual statute for personal injury actions” and any “coordi- nate tolling and revival provisions.” Id. at 211 (quotation omitted). In this interlocutory appeal, Appellee Jane Doe argues her federal claims are timely because 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. * This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. § 5533(b)(2)(i.1) is a coordinate tolling rule. We disagree and will reverse in part the Dis- trict Court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND1 Doe enrolled at East Stroudsburg University (“ESU”) in 2016. In 2016 and 2017, she had an on-again-off-again romantic relationship with a resident advisor named Victor Burns. On March 30, 2018, Doe and Burns had a verbal and physical altercation. Doe alleges that Burns raped her that night. Doe reported the incident to campus police and filed a Title IX complaint. ESU found Burns responsible for violating its code of conduct, though not for violations of provisions covering sexual assault or harassment. ESU sus- pended Burns for a year but ultimately permitted him to reenroll. Meanwhile, Doe endured harassment from Burns’s fraternity brothers, experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and suffered academically. In December 2018, Doe decided she could no longer “bear [her] anxiety” and left ESU. Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 71. In 2022, Doe sued ESU, several individual defendants affiliated with ESU (collec- tively, the “Appellants”), and Burns. She amended her complaint to the operative version (the “Complaint”) in 2023. Doe alleges two federal claims. The first charges ESU with violating 20 U.S.C. § 1681, which is part of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1 Because Appellants challenge the District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss, we take the facts from the complaint, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (When considering a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept all of the com- plaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” (citing Ash- croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). 2 1972. The second charges the Appellants and Burns with violating substantive-due-pro- cess rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Am