State of Iowa v. Marqwane Smtih

── State of Iowa v. Marqwane Smtih ── Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa Date: May 13, 2026 Category: General IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 24-1285 Filed May 13, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Marqwane Smith, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, The Honorable Linda M. Fangman, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas Siefert, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Mullins, S.J. Opinion by Mullins, S.J. 1 MULLINS, Senior Judge. After a late night out in Waterloo, Richard Sturdivant parked his Chevrolet Tahoe in a residential driveway, where he sat for a moment drinking tequila and listening to music. It was not long before a white pickup pulled up behind him. Three men emerged from the truck, opened the door of the idling Tahoe, and began to assault Sturdivant. The struggle ended when one of the assailants shot Sturdivant three times at close range, paralyzing him from the waist down. A home security camera recorded these events from start-to-finish. The State charged Marqwane Smith for his involvement in the attack on Sturdivant. A jury later found him guilty of first-degree burglary under Iowa Code section 713.3 (2023) and felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm under section 724.26. 1 Smith now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those convictions. He also contends he is entitled to a new trial due to the admission of prejudicial evidence. Reviewing for correction of errors at law, we affirm. I. Burglary There is no dispute that Smith was one of the men who ambushed Richard Sturdivant through the door of his Tahoe. But Smith denies that his conduct satisfied the requirements of first-degree burglary. To prove that charge, the State had to show that Smith—or a person he aided and abetted—entered an occupied structure without right, license, or privilege to do so and while having the intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft therein. 1 The State also charged Smith with murder and first-degree robbery. With respect to those charges, the jury found Smith guilty of the lesser-included offenses of assault with intent to inflict serious injury and willful injury causing serious injury. Smith does not challenge these convictions. 2 Iowa Code § 713.1. On appeal, Smith contends the State failed to show that Sturdivant’s Tahoe was an “occupied structure” within the meaning of section 713.1. Our criminal code defines “occupied structure” to include “any building, structure, appurtenances to buildings and structures, land, water or air vehicle . . . occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.” Id. § 702.12.2 This definition includes two prongs: “The first describes the type of place that can be the subject of burglary, and the second considers its purpose or use.” State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Iowa 1999)). Everybody agrees that Sturdivant’s Tahoe—a land vehicle—satisfies the place requirement. The question we must decide is whether the Tahoe meets the purpose requirement. A qualifying purpose under