United States v. Stinson

── United States v. Stinson ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Date: May 11, 2026 Category: Direct Criminal Case: 25-60371 Document: 48-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED May 11, 2026 No. 25-60371 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk ____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Tanner Stinson, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 1:25-CR-8-1 ______________________________ Before Barksdale, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Tanner Stinson pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Challenging his within-Guidelines 135-months’-imprisonment sentence, he contends the district court erred by: applying a two-level vulnerable-victim enhancement under Guideline § 3A1.1(b)(1); and using _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-60371 Document: 48-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 No. 25-60371 conditional sentencing language, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B). Regarding Stinson’s § 3A1.1(b)(1) challenge, he contends the court erred by concluding: the minor victim (MV) was unusually vulnerable; and Stinson should have known the MV’s susceptibility to his criminal conduct. “Review of a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is de novo and review of a district court’s application of unusual vulnerability in the arena of sentencing is for clear error.” United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740, 753 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We will reverse a fact finding as clearly erroneous “only if a review of all the evidence leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”. United States v. Mendoza-Gomez, 69 F.4th 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Section 3A1.1(b)(1) provides for a two-level sentence enhancement “[i]f . . . defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim”. United States v. Smith, 115 F.4th 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). As for the MV’s vulnerability, Stinson contends the court did not rely on victim-specific factors. On the contrary, the record reflects the court relied on the MV’s psychological and cognitive assessment, which detailed her fifth-percentile score in adaptive behavior, defined in the assessment as “the things that people do to function in their everyday lives”. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in concluding the MV had “diminished ability . . . to thwart or resist the crime at hand”. United States v. Swenson, 25 F.4th 309, 321 (5th Cir. 2022). Similarly, Stinson fails to show clear error in the court’s concluding he should have known the MV’s susceptibility to criminal conduct. The unrebutted evidence in the presentence investigation report (PSR) shows, in addition to meeting the MV twice in person, Stinson communicated with her