Tyrone Holland v. Governor of the State of Georgia

── Tyrone Holland v. Governor of the State of Georgia ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Date: May 11, 2026 Category: NEW USCA11 Case: 25-14515 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 1 of 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14515 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ TYRONE WILLIAM HOLLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-00502-MLB ____________________ Before LUCK, BRASHER, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Tyrone Holland, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for seeking time-barred relief and thus failing to USCA11 Case: 25-14515 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 2 of 6 2 Opinion of the Court 25-14515 state a claim. Holland argues that the statute of limitations does not bar his constitutional due process challenge to Georgia’s sex of- fender registry statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(3), because that stat- ute continues to injure him. After careful review, we affirm the dis- trict court. I. Section 42-1-12 of the Code of Georgia first required Holland to register as a sex offender in 2015. See O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(3) (2015). Holland filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of section 42-1-12(e)(3) in 2025. He alleges that section 42-1-12(e)(3) violates his due process right to fair notice un- der the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court sua sponte dis- missed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for being time-barred and thus failing to state a claim. Holland appealed. After Holland filed his initial brief, he filed for leave to amend and to file a supplemental brief. We grant both motions and consider Holland’s new briefs. II. We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, viewing the allegations in the complaint as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003). We also review de novo a district court’s “interpretation and application of a statute of limitations.” Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017). USCA11 Case: 25-14515 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2026 Page: 3 of 6 25-14515 Opinion of the Court 3 The only issue before us is whether Holland’s section 1983 claim is timely. We answer that question “injury-by-injury and claim-by-claim” through a two-step analysis. Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2022). First, we identify the alleged injuries and determine when Holland could have sued for them. Id. Second, we determine whether the statutes of limita- tions for those claims ran before Holland filed and, if so, whether the continuing violation doctrine saves his otherwise time-barred claims. Id. A. We start by identifying which injuries Holland describes in his