Yergler v. City of Eugene

── Yergler v. City of Eugene ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 11, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAMUEL YERGLER; NICHOLAS No. 25-953 HOLLOWS, D.C. No. 6:23-cv-01545-MC Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF EUGENE, Defendant - Appellee, ERIC EASON, in his official capacity, ERIC HUBBARD, in his official capacity, CRAIG CARNAGEY, in his official capacity, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 15, 2026 Portland, Oregon Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs Samuel Yergler and Nicholas Hollows (“Plaintiffs”) appeal from * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. the district court’s (1) grant of summary judgment to the City of Eugene (“the City”) based on its determination that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a facial challenge for prospective relief, and (2) denial of leave to amend their Complaint. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment and reverse the denial of leave to amend. 1. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the standing requirements “less stringently” in the First Amendment context. Imperial Sovereign Ct. of Mont. v. Knudsen, 170 F.4th 820, 834 (9th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted). “[W]hen the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the inquiry tilts dramatically toward a finding of standing.” Ariz. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A plaintiff bringing a pre-enforcement challenge satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement when he alleges (1) “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,” (2) that conduct is “proscribed by a statute”; (3) “and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 25-953  Because they seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief in their challenge to the City’s Park and Open Space Rules (“Park Rules”), Plaintiffs must satisfy the Driehaus standard for pre-enforcement challenges. Generally, a plaintiff must articulate a “concrete plan” to violate the challenged rule or allege specifically how they would violate the challenged rule if not for the challenged rule’s chilling effect. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). A concrete plan need not be “cast in stone,” but must be more than a “general intent to violate a statute at some unknown date in the future.” Id. Particularly when the plaintiff has not violated the challenged rule in the past, they must give “details about their future speech such as ‘when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances.’” Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d at 787 (quoting Thomas,