People v. Robinson

── People v. Robinson ── Court: California Court of Appeal Date: May 08, 2026 Category: General Filed 5/8/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089332 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SC058124A) v. HENRY WAYNE ROBINSON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew Kendall, Judge. David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and Tyrone Sandoval, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-  INTRODUCTION Defendant Henry Wayne Robinson was scheduled for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75 because his judgment included three 1-year sentencing terms for prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b). Ultimately, however, the trial court determined defendant was ineligible for resentencing based on subdivision (f) of section 1172.75 because his sentence included a term of life without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the court granted the People’s motion to dismiss resentencing. As of January 1, 2025, subdivision (f) of section 1172.75 provides that “an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole, who, as of January 1, 2025, has not had their judgment reviewed and verified by the sentencing court as provided in subdivision (c), is not eligible for recall and resentencing under this section.” Defendant contends the court erred because subdivision (f) of section 1172.75 does not apply to him. He argues subdivision (f) should be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a term of life without the possibility of parole.2 Because defendant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 He also asserts subdivision (f) of section 1172.75 does not apply to him because his judgment was reviewed and verified by the sentencing court prior to January 1, 2025, when the trial court reviewed his criminal case to confirm the existence of a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement and calendared the matter for recall and resentencing. However, he states that he “does not rely on [the] retroactivity provision” of section 1172.75, subdivision (f) on appeal. Because defendant does not rely on this argument and we resolve the appeal on other grounds, we do not address the retroactivity provision or whether defendant’s judgment was reviewed and verified by the court prior to January 1, 2025. 2. violent offense, he contends he does not meet the criteria to be excluded from resentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of section 1172.75. The People argue subdivision (f) should be construed disjunctively to exclude from resentencing any individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense or sentenced to death or a term of life without the possibility of parole. Because defendant’s sentence includes a term of life without the possibility of parole, the People contend he is ineligible for resentencing. We conclude both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history support a conj