People v. Ulukivaiola CA3

── People v. Ulukivaiola CA3 ── Court: California Court of Appeal Date: May 08, 2026 Category: General Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Ulukivaiola CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) THE PEOPLE, C102886 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 04F02695) v. GARY BRUCE ULUKIVAIOLA, Defendant and Appellant. A jury found defendant Gary Bruce Ulukivaiola guilty of first degree murder and found true a special circumstance under Penal Code1 section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), for a killing defendant participated in during a robbery when he was 23 years old. Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Defendant later filed a motion to have an evidence preservation proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to make a record of mitigating evidence related to his youth at the time of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, finding him ineligible under People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin) to a future youthful offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. Defendant appeals. We reverse. The court in People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 485, 494 (Briscoe) concluded, notwithstanding Hardin, section 3051 violates equal protection as 1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 1 applied to youth offenders who were convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant may have been so convicted and therefore might be entitled to relief under section 3051. The trial court consequently erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion. Without taking a position on the correctness of Briscoe, we remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility for a Franklin hearing. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In our opinion from defendant’s direct appeal, we summarized the crime as follows. (People v. Faulalo (Nov. 17, 2008, C055080) [nonpub. opn.].) In March 2004, when defendant was 23 years old, defendant, Langima’a Faulalo, Ben Taholo, and Semisi Fahiua broke into a home yelling they were police. (Ibid.) When the victim Danny Johnson came out of a bedroom, Taholo shot Johnson in the leg. (Ibid.) Johnson “kept coming and [defendant] shot him in the chest. The latter shot proved fatal.” (Ibid.) Defendant was tried with Faulalo and their jury was instructed on felony murder. The felony murder jury instruction stated the defendants may be guilty of murder “under a theory of felony murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death” if the jury found “defendant intended to commit or intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the robbery” and “[w]hile committing the robbery, the perpetrator did an act that caused the death of another person.” The jury was also given a CALCRIM No. 703 special circumstances instruction for the murder under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) as follows: “If you decide that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special circumstance of murder in commission of a felony, you must also decide whether the defendant acted either with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life. [¶] … [T]he [prosecution] must prove either that the defendant intended to kill