W. Griffin v. Emory Healthcare, Inc.

── W. Griffin v. Emory Healthcare, Inc. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Date: May 07, 2026 Category: NEW USCA11 Case: 25-12457 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 05/07/2026 Page: 1 of 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12457 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ W. A. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC., WENDY WRIGHT, M.D., WILLIE SMITH, JR., M.D., DAN OWENS, CEO, Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 25-12457 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 05/07/2026 Page: 2 of 6 2 Opinion of the Court 25-12457 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-05060-MHC ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: W.A. Griffin, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Emory Health Inc., Wendy Wright, M.D., Willie Smith, Jr., M.D., and Dan Owens. She argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint, which she filed after the deadline to amend. She further argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, even though she never objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation thereof. And she asserts that the judge be- low improperly failed to recuse. These arguments fail and, as a re- sult, we affirm the district court. I. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014). And, generally, we hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and liberally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But that “leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69 (citation modified). USCA11 Case: 25-12457 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 05/07/2026 Page: 3 of 6 25-12457 Opinion of the Court 3 When the court imposes a scheduling order deadline, as it did here, a plaintiff seeking leave to amend his complaint after the deadline passes must demonstrate “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009). The “good cause standard pre- cludes modification unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation modified). “The lack of diligence that precludes a finding of good cause” includes “a plaintiff who has full knowledge of the information with which it seeks to amend its complaint before the deadline passes.” S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc., 575 F.3d at 1241 n.3. And “it is not an abuse of dis- cretion for a district court to deny a motion for leave to amend fol- lowing the close of discovery, past the deadline for amendments[,] and past the deadline for filing dispositive motions.” Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, under Rule 1