Department of Children and Families v. State of Florida, Sardo

── Department of Children and Families v. State of Florida, Sardo ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: May 08, 2026 Category: General DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Petitioner, v. ANTHONY SARDO and STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. No. 2D2025-2311 May 8, 2026 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Christopher M. LaBruzzo, Judge. Nandie R. Sharma, Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Tampa, for Petitioner. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent State of Florida. No appearance for Respondent Anthony Sardo. PER CURIAM. The Department of Children and Families has petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking to quash an order adjudging Anthony Sardo incompetent to proceed in his criminal case and committing him to the Department's custody. The State of Florida, a respondent here, acknowledges that the evidence before the circuit court did not satisfy the statutory criteria for involuntarily committing Sardo. We grant the petition and quash the order insofar as it commits Sardo to the custody of the Department. We take no issue with the determination that Sardo is incompetent. The State charged Sardo with felony burglary. When it became apparent that Sardo might not be competent to stand trial, the circuit court followed the procedures set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) and section 916.12, Florida Statutes (2025), to assess his competency. Two experts evaluated Sardo, and both of them found that he was incompetent to proceed. Importantly, they both also recommended that the court place him in a residential facility within the community. Their reports did not address other placement options. The circuit court referred Sardo to Suncoast Center, a certified behavioral health clinic. Suncoast Center reported that it could not procure a placement for Sardo. Based on the clinic's inability to place Sardo, the court determined that "the least restrictive option that is available for [Sardo] is the State Hospital." The court issued an order committing Sardo to the Department's care with an instruction to place him in a state mental health facility for treatment. The Department seeks relief from this order. "[T]o obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist '(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on post judgment appeal.' " Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). The parties do not dispute that the Department has satisfied the jurisdictional prongs of this test. See Dep't of Child. & Fams. 2 v. Campbell, 295 So. 3d 868, 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (holding that an order wrongfully committing a person to a state agency's care creates a "material injury" because the agency "is responsible for expending its appropriated funds in accordance with the laws governing the agency" and the Department has "no direct right of appeal"). "As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court's review of orders committing an individual involuntarily." Reilly v. State, 970 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The question remaining is whether the order departed from the essential requirements of law. A defendant must be mentally competent for a court to proceed with any material stage of a criminal prosecution. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(a). When a court finds that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, it must then determine an appropriate treatment and placement as prescribed in section 916.13(1): (1) Every defendant who is charged with