Johnson v. City of Vidalia

── Johnson v. City of Vidalia ── Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Date: May 05, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Case No. S25C1294 May 5, 2026 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. The following order was passed: AMY WADE JOHNSON v. CITY OF VIDALIA. The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in this case. All the Justices concur. Court of Appeals Case No. A25A0586 PINSON, Justice, concurring. I join the Court’s decision to deny review of this case. I write separately to flag as problematic one of the Court of Ap- peals’s alternative bases in support of its conclusion that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claim against it. Amy Johnson was running with a friend in the City of Vi- dalia when she tripped over an uneven part of a sidewalk and fell, hurting her shoulder and face. She sued the City, claiming that her injuries were caused by the City’s negligence and mainte- nance of a nuisance. The City moved for summary judgment on several bases, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that disputed issues of material fact remained for a jury to decide. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the City was entitled to summary judgment on both claims against it. In support of its holding that the City was entitled to sum- mary judgment on Johnson’s negligence claim, the Court of Ap- peals said that it has “never held that a passive failure to main- tain a sidewalk would be a basis for [municipal] liability,” and that imposing such liability required “some affirmative action the city performed in a negligent manner.” City of Vidalia v. Johnson, 375 Ga. App. 601, 604 (2025). On this point, the court was mis- taken. Cities have long had a duty to keep their streets and side- walks safe for ordinary travel. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Hamp- ton, 139 Ga. 389, 392 (1913) (“It is very common, in stating the rule, to say that it is the duty of a municipal corporation to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, so that persons can pass along them in the ordinary methods of travel in safety.”). That well-established duty plainly includes addressing hazards within the boundaries of the sidewalk that render its use for ordinary travel unsafe. See City of Milton v. Chang, __ Ga. __ (2026), S25G0476, slip op. at 6 (Ga. Mar. 12, 2026); City Council of Augusta v. Tharpe, 113 Ga. 152, 156 (1901) (“[T]here can be no doubt, under the rules of law now settled by repeated adjudica- tions in this and other jurisdictions, that the city authorities must keep in a reasonably safe condition all parts of its sidewalks which are intended to be used by the public.”) (citing City of At- lanta v. Milam, 95 Ga. 135, 137 (1894)). And a city may be held liable for negligent failure to mitigate such a hazard as long as it had actual or constructive notice of it, regardless of whether the city took any “affirmative action” that allowed the hazard to arise. See OCGA § 32-4-93(a) (municipality is relieved of liability for “defects” in its streets and sidewalks if the city “has not been neg- ligent in constructing or maintaining” its roads, or lacked actual or constructive notice of the defect). 1 See also, e.g., Hampton, 139 Ga. at 390 (city was liable when a pedestrian fell after stepping on the broken cap of a water meter on a city sidewalk, because the cap had been broken for at least a we