John Doe v. SEC (PUBLIC REISSUED OPINION)

── John Doe v. SEC (PUBLIC REISSUED OPINION) ── Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Date: May 01, 2026 Category: General United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 8, 2025 Decided April 17, 2026 Reissued May 1, 2026 No. 23-1124 JOHN DOE, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT On Petition for Review of an Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission Stephen M. Kohn argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kayla Svihovec and Todd Yoder. David K. Colapinto entered an appearance. Stephanie K. Glaberson was on the brief for amicus curiae the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law in support of petitioner. Margaux Ewen was on the brief for amici curiae the Signals Network, et al. in support of petitioner.  2 Joseph Slaughter and Neil L. Henrichsen were on the brief for amici curiae Journalists, Editors, News Publishers, and Press Organizations in support of petitioner. Duane R. Gibson and Will Kramer were on the brief for amici curiae RM, et al. in support of petitioner. Emily True Parise, Senior Appellate Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Tracey A. Hardin, Solicitor. Before: PILLARD and PAN, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge ROGERS. ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: On the basis of information that John Doe disclosed about the misconduct of a large Company to the news media, the Securities and Exchange Commission successfully prosecuted an enforcement action against the Company. During the Commission’s investigation, Congress and Commission staff contacted Doe for interviews and information about the disclosures to the news media, and Doe repeatedly obliged. On the basis of the same information, Doe filed an application with the Commission for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which authorizes the Commission to make monetary awards to individuals who “voluntarily” provide “original information” to the Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a), (b)(1); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4 (“Rule 21F-4”). The Commission denied Doe’s application for an award because his submission was made only after the Commission had contacted him and thus was not “voluntarily” submitted under the statute and its  3 rules. Doe’s submission was also untimely. The Commission summarily denied Doe’s request for exemptions. Doe petitions for review. He contends that instead of applying the plain statutory text and its precedent, the Commission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner because its interpretation of “voluntarily” in Rule 21F-4(a) is contrary to common sense and the plain meaning and purpose of the term as well as dictionary definitions. Also, he maintains that his submission was timely. Alternatively, Doe contends that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and contrary to Commission precedent. Further, withholding financial rewards from whistleblowers due to their speech to the press, Doe maintains, raises questions under the First Amendment to the Constitution. Petitioner’s Br. 24–28. For the following reasons, Doe’s challenges to the Commission’s determination of his non-entitlement to a whistleblower award and to the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory term “voluntarily” are unpersuasive. His First Amendment objection is based on a false premise. Doe’s challenge to the Commission’s denial of his request for an exemption from Rule 21F-4(a) is persuasive, however. In denying Doe’s request for exemption from the voluntariness requirements, the Commission abused its discretion by perfunctorily restating the statutory policy goals in respon