Sanchez Gonzalez v. Blanche

── Sanchez Gonzalez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 07, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 7 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ISRAEL SANCHEZ GONZALEZ, No. 22-110 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-321-202 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 22, 2026** Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges. Israel Sanchez Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence whether the agency erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Sanchez Gonzalez has not shown exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006 (petitioner must show hardship “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves the country” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Sanchez Gonzalez’s contention that his daughter would experience hardship when visiting him in Mexico is not properly before the court because he did not raise it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (administrative remedies must be exhausted); see also Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but must be enforced if properly raised by a party). We reject as unsupported by the record Sanchez Gonzalez’s contention that the BIA erred by failing to consider country conditions evidence. We do not 2 22-110 consider the materials Sanchez Gonzalez references in the opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Thus, Sanchez Gonzalez’s cancellation of removal claim fails. Sanchez Gonzalez does not challenge the agency’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, so we do not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). Sanchez Gonzalez’s contention that the IJ failed to consider his motion to terminate is not properly before the court because Sanchez Gonzalez did not raise it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (administrative remedies must be exhausted); see also Suate-Orellana, 101 F.4th at 629. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 3 22-110