United States v. Tarik Chambers

── United States v. Tarik Chambers ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: May 08, 2026 Category: General U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 24-1139 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TARIK CHAMBERS, Appellant _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Michael M. Baylson, No. 2:22-cr-00135-001 Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges Submitted Apr. 28, 2025; Decided May 8, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Appellant Tarik Chambers appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time in supplemental briefing on appeal that the District Court violated Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by improperly participating in plea discussions. Because we conclude that the District Court plainly violated Rule 11(c)(1), we will vacate, remand, and reassign.1 * This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 Chambers also challenges his plea on the grounds that the District Court improperly (1) denied Chambers a neuropsychological evaluation, and (2) failed to order a competency hearing. Because we vacate the plea on Rule 11(c)(1) grounds, we need not reach these alternative bases for relief.  I. DISCUSSION2 A. Excusing Forfeiture Because Chambers did not raise his Rule 11(c)(1) challenge before the District Court or in his opening brief on appeal and addressed it only after we ordered the parties to do so in supplemental briefing, we first must determine “if there are extraordinary or exceptional circumstances counseling us to [reach the argument].” United States v. Sok, 115 F.4th 251, 264 (3d Cir. 2024). To identify extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, “we typically consider any excuse for [a party’s failure to timely raise an argument], the extent to which considering the issue would prejudice the opposing party, and whether our failure to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine confidence in the judicial system.” Id. (citation modified). While we are “slightly less reluctant to bar consideration of a forfeited pure question of law,” this narrow exception to the preservation rule “applies to all forfeited issues.” Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017). Here, we conclude that threshold is met and exceptional circumstances “compel our review.” Id. at 148. We are not moved by the justification Chambers offers for belatedly raising the Rule 11(c)(1) issue—namely that our recent decision in United States v. Brown, 169 F.4th 156 (3d Cir. 2026), constituted a change in law he could not have anticipated. In Brown, we held that a district court violated Rule 11(c)(1) by explicitly proposing a sentence during plea negotiations. Id. at 158, 160. But Brown—though involving unique 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 facts—is simply an application of the Supreme Court’s longstanding ruling in United States v. Davila (Davila I), 569 U.S. 597 (2013). Nonetheless, we will reach the Rule 11(c)(1) issue here because it “would not implicate the prudential concerns underlying the forfeiture doctrine.” Barna, 877 F.3d at 148. Specifically, the Government cannot be “unduly surprised,” id. at 149, because it is well-acquainted with Davila I; we raised the issue with both parties, and the Government had the opportunity to fully brief the issue pursuant to our briefing order. In addition, failing to reach the is