Alicia Anderson v. Superior Court of Delaware

── Alicia Anderson v. Superior Court of Delaware ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: May 08, 2026 Category: General NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-3385 __________ ALICIA ANDERSON, Appellant v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, (New Castle County); SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, (Kent County); ALL JUDGES IN THE STATE OF DELAWARE, State of Delaware ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00834) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer L. Hall ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 23, 2026 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed May 8, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  Alicia Anderson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware’s order dismissing her complaint. Because we agree that Anderson’s claims are barred by immunity, we will affirm. Anderson filed an IFP complaint, alleging the Superior Court of Delaware, the Supreme Court of Delaware, and “all judges in the State of Delaware” caused her “emotional distress, possible fraud – definitely the opportunity for identity theft, etc.” ECF Doc. No. 3 at 7. She sought monetary and injunctive relief. These claims appear to stem from the dismissal of cases she filed in Delaware state courts in 2024 and 2025. The District Court screened and dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), holding that the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.1 Anderson appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the dismissal. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, see Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013), Anderson’s allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 1 The District Court also ruled on several motions that Anderson had filed. Because Anderson does not challenge those rulings in her brief, we do not consider them. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding claims forfeited where no support provided in brief or reply.). 2 To the extent Anderson raises new claims for the first time on appeal, we will not 2  Anderson is not eligible for monetary relief that she seeks against the individual defendants because they are entitled to absolute immunity for such claims. Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998). A judge is immune from suits for money damages unless the challenged actions were not taken in their judicial capacity or were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). A judicial act or omission is still taken in a judicial capacity even if it “was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Anderson has not alleged any facts suggesting the defendants acted outside this broad scope. Although “absolute judicial immunity extends only to c