State v. Bard

── State v. Bard ── Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut Date: May 05, 2026 Author: Mullins Category: General ************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Bard STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEVIN BARD (SC 21016) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus Convicted of one count each of murder and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order, and three counts of criminal violation of a pro- tective order, the defendant appealed to this court. The charges were tried together, and the defendant did not move to server the murder charge from the protective order violation charges. At trial, the defendant admitted to killing the victim but claimed that he had lacked the requisite intent to commit murder due to extreme intoxication and irrational feelings of anger at the time of the killing. While this appeal was pending, the trial court issued an articulation of the reasons why it did not exercise its discretion, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 41-18) governing severance of offenses, to order severance of the murder charge from the protective order violation charges. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to recognize that it had the discretionary authority under Practice Book § 41-18 to order, sua sponte, severance of the murder charge from the protective order violation charges. Held: Insofar as the defendant failed to move for severance in the trial court, his claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to recognize that it had the authority to order severance sua sponte under Practice Book § 41-18 was unpreserved and, therefore, not reviewable. This court was not persuaded by the defendant’s contention that his claim was preserved inasmuch as the trial court’s articulation constituted a ruling on the issue of that court’s authority to sever the charges sua sponte, as a motion for articulation may not be utilized to preserve for appeal an issue that was not raised in the trial court. Moreover, even if the defendant’s claim had been preserved, there was no merit to his contention that the trial court’s decision not to order severance was based solely on its belief that, in the absence of a proper motion for severance, it did not have the authority to order severance sua sponte, as it was clear that the court’s primary reasons for not ordering severance were its determinations that the charge offenses were of the same character and that evidence of the murder and protective order violations would have been cross admissible if those offenses had been tried separ