Gonzalez Gonzalez v. Blanche

── Gonzalez Gonzalez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 01, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ANTONIO GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, No. 22-1818 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-350-673 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 23, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Antonio Gonzalez Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition. 1. Exhaustion. We may not review a claim unless a petitioner has “exhausted all administrative remedies available.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416–18, 421 (2023). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner identify their claim with enough precision to put the agency “sufficiently on notice so that it ‘had an opportunity to pass on th[e] issue.’” Umana- Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020)). Gonzalez Gonzalez did not argue before the BIA a pattern-or-practice claim or raise his first, second, or fifth proposed particular social groups (PSG). Likewise, Gonzalez Gonzalez did not develop any legal argument before the BIA with respect to his sixth PSG. See id. We agree with the BIA that Gonzalez Gonzalez forfeited review of these issues. Because they are not exhausted, we do not address them here. 2. Asylum and Withholding of Removal. Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ and adds additional reasoning, we review “both the BIA’s decision and the portions of the IJ’s decision adopted by the BIA.” Diaz v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We also review whether a PSG is socially distinct for substantial evidence. Id. at 1242. Under that standard, the “agency’s findings of fact [are] conclusive unless any reasonable 2 22-1818 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Edgar G.C. v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A petitioner may demonstrate an objectively reasonable well-founded fear of future persecution by showing that he belongs to a “disfavored group” and faces an individualized risk of persecution as a member of that group. Lapadat v. Bondi, 145 F.4th 942, 958 (9th Cir. 2025). “[A] general, undifferentiated claim . . . does not render [a petitioner] eligible for asylum.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Instead, an asylum applicant must show that he faces a “unique risk of persecution . . . distinct from [his] mere membership in a disfavored group.” Id. at 1180 n.5. Here, the record does