Lemus v. Clark County School District

── Lemus v. Clark County School District ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 04, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROSA LAINEZ LEMUS, individually, and No. 25-2699 as natural parent and guardian of minor D.C. No. G.R.L; G.R.L., a minor, 2:24-cv-00700-JAD-MDC Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant - Appellee, and Doctor JESUS F. JARA, individual and official capacity, RONNIE GUERZON, individual and official capacity, RAYMOND ORTIZ, individual and official capacity, BROOKE RAWLINS, individual and official capacity, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 10, 2026 Las Vegas, Nevada * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: BENNETT and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and HOLCOMB, District Judge.** G.R.L. was violently attacked by a fellow student, N.A., while attending school in the Clark County School District (“CCSD”). G.R.L. and her mother (“Plaintiffs”) sued CCSD under § 1983 for a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They advanced a state-created danger theory, alleging that CCSD knew that N.A. was violent and placed N.A. in a general education classroom setting pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of placing violent students in such classrooms. The district court found that the alleged facts did not plausibly support Plaintiffs’ state-created danger theory and granted CCSD’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to dismiss,” a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “To succeed on a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must establish ** The Honorable John W. Holcomb, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 2 25-2699 that (1) a state actor’s affirmative actions created or exposed him to ‘an actual, particularized danger [that he] would not otherwise have faced,’ (2) that the injury he suffered was foreseeable, and (3) that the state actor was deliberately indifferent to the known danger.” Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 680 (9th Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2018)). Moreover, to prevail on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must show that the municipality “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation he suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). 1. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a reasonable inference that the danger of injury was foreseeable.1 They have alleged one incident in which N.A. acted violently, which consisted of N.A. “calling