Morales-Lopez v. Blanche

── Morales-Lopez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 04, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NERY MORALES-LOPEZ, No. 25-3173 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-069-499 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 30, 2026** Before: RAWLINSON, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Nery Morales-Lopez is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  “Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994)] and also provides its own review of the evidence and law, we review both the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) and the BIA’s decisions.” Rudnitskyy v. Garland, 82 F.4th 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011)). In reviewing denials of discretionary immigration relief, we only have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024). 1. We deny Morales-Lopez’s petition as to his cancellation of removal application. A noncitizen who is otherwise “inadmissible or deportable” is eligible for cancellation of removal if they (1) have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years or more; (2) have been a person of good moral character during that time; (3) have not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses; and (4) “establish[ ] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2025). If a noncitizen meets these four statutory criteria, the agency “may exercise its discretion to cancel the alien’s removal.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 999. Morales-Lopez argues that the BIA committed legal error by finding that he did not provide sufficient evidence that his qualifying relatives met the hardship 2 25-3173 standard. But the IJ also denied Morales-Lopez’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that a prior assault conviction rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because it was a crime of domestic violence. Morales-Lopez does not challenge this independently dispositive finding, and his petition for review therefore fails. See Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not raised in an opening brief are forfeited); see also Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 227 (2021); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (explaining that the burden of proof in removal proceedings lies with the noncitizen). Further, the IJ also found that Morales-Lopez was not entitled to cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion, an