Maloney v. United States Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation

── Maloney v. United States Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 04, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EDDIE MALONEY, No. 25-2213 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:23-cv-08632-SMB v. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF NAVAJO MEMORANDUM* AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 15, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff Eddie Maloney, who is Navajo, appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of the U.S. Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (“ONHIR”) on Plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act claim challenging the denial of his application for relocation benefits under the Navajo-Hopi Land * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Settlement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–531, 88 Stat. 1712 (the “Act”). The Act provided for the division of certain reservation land, known as the Joint Use Area, into Hopi Partitioned Lands and Navajo Partitioned Lands. Fuson v. Off. of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, 134 F.4th 1010, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2025). To qualify for relocation benefits, “the head of household and/or immediate family must have been residents on December 22, 1974, of an area partitioned to the Tribe of which they were not members.” 25 C.F.R. § 700.147(a).1 We review the summary judgment de novo. Fuson, 134 F.4th at 1015. We set aside ONHIR’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Comm’n, 878 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1989).2 We reverse and remand for payment of benefits. 1 The parties stipulate that Plaintiff became a head of household in April 1972, so Plaintiff meets the head-of-household requirement. 2 The Government is admonished to refrain from citing the “substantial evidence” standard as described in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), and other immigration decisions, in non-immigration cases such as this Administrative Procedure Act appeal. Those immigration decisions do not apply here. Cf. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that Elias-Zacarias “does not describe the standard of review in [a social security] case”). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (providing that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court shall set aside agency action that is “unsupported by substantial evidence”), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that, for orders of removal, 2 25-2213  1. Substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer’s adverse credibility determination for Darrell Woody. Woody’s “young age at the time of the events” is not “a legitimate basis” for an adverse credibility finding. Fuson, 134 F.4th at 1017 & n.4. The hearing officer also found that Woody’s testimony was “too indefinite” to be credible, but Woody provided detailed testimony, stating that he lived across the canyon from Plaintiff at Black Mesa and that Plain