Roshan v. Sunquist

── Roshan v. Sunquist ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 05, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PEYMAN ROSHAN, No. 25-3157 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:24-cv-02789-JST v. MEMORANDUM* CHIKA SUNQUIST, California Real Estate Commissioner; DOUGLAS R. MCCAULEY; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 30, 2026** Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges. Peyman Roshan appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claims against Chika Sunquist, Douglas McCauley, and the California Department of Real * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Estate (“DRE”). We review questions of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and applications of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 1. Roshan’s claims against the DRE fail because the DRE is a state agency and California has not waived sovereign immunity. See Roshan v. McCauley, 130 F.4th 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2025) (characterizing the DRE as a state agency). California has not “unequivocally expressed” a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), and “a State’s consent to suit in its own courts is not a waiver of its immunity from suit in federal court,” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011). The Supreme Court did not silently modify this doctrine in DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285 (2024), as Roshan contests. 2. Roshan’s remaining claims on appeal fail due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine “prohibits federal district courts from considering ‘de facto appeals’—suits in which ‘the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.’” Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). Though he has sued 2 25-3157 the DRE, Sunquist, and McCauley, Roshan seeks a de facto appeal of the California Supreme Court’s decision to deny review of the California State Bar disciplinary order at the foundation of the defendants’ actions. His claims are analogous to those dismissed in D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), see id. at 486–87. Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168 (2025), does not alter this analysis, id. at 179. The district court therefore appropriately dismissed Roshan’s claims. AFFIRMED. 3 25-3157