Crystal Biton v. United States

── Crystal Biton v. United States ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: May 05, 2026 Category: General DLD-118 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-3055 ___________ CRYSTAL BITON; DANIELLE BITON, Appellants v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; UNITED AIRLINES; UNITED CONTINENTAL AIRLINES; HSBC; MORGAN MELHUISH & ABRUTYN; EASTBANK; NEW YORK & NEW JERSEY PORT AUTHORITY; KEVIN MCKIRGAN; KATHLEEN CARLA ALEXANDER; ELIZABETH HARRIS; BANK OF AMERICA; CHASE JPMORGAN; NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; NORTH MIAMI POLICE; BURGER KING; MCDONALDS CORP.; CHICAGO INSURANCE CO. ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-11458) District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi ____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 23, 2026 Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 5, 2026) _________ OPINION* _________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM Crystal and Danielle Biton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeal from the District Court’s order dismissing their complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. In December 2024, the Appellants filed a complaint in the District Court against various governmental and private entities and individuals, including, inter alia, the Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, United Airlines, Bank of America, The New York Police Department, and McDonald’s. They invoked federal-question jurisdiction, citing the Bill of Rights, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and “disability human rights” and purported to assert claims for identity theft; due process violations; denial of medical care; theft of property; stalking; “illegal[] attack by two Police lawyers,” causing “serious physical injuries”; exposure to “harmful chemicals;” and deprivation of “healthcare, employment, Bill of Rights, FDIC, SOX, [and] Americans Disability Rights.” Compl. 2–4; ECF No. 1. The District Court, having granted Appellants permission to proceed in forma pauperis, screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and concluded that they had not stated a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, the District Court dismissed it. Appellants appealed. 2  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In order to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may summarily affirm if an appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. The District Court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). While pro se p