Harrington v. Lancaster

── Harrington v. Lancaster ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Date: May 04, 2026 Category: Civil Rights Case: 25-20360 Document: 48-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/04/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 25-20360 FILED May 4, 2026 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Tyler Harrington, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus James Lancaster; Nathaniel Cano; Jared Lindsay, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-366 ______________________________ Before Jones, Stewart, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * This Fourth Amendment case began with a neighbor’s mistake. The neighbor called 911 to report a possible home invasion but gave officers the wrong address. Acting on that information, officers entered the wrong home to conduct a protective sweep, expecting to find either a vacant house or an intruder. Instead, they found Tyler Harrington and his wife asleep in bed. The officers then wondered aloud whether they had the right address. But _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-20360 Document: 48-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/04/2026 No. 25-20360 instead of confirming where they were, they stepped back to the front door, knocked, and re-entered moments later. During that second entry, they awoke the underwear-clad couple, ordered them at gunpoint to put their hands up and “stay right there,” and questioned them. * * * The district court erred in dismissing Harrington’s unlawful entry, search, and seizure claims arising from the officers’ second entry. On the facts alleged, apparent consent justified the officers’ initial entry and sweep—but not their return moments later. A warrantless entry may be valid when officers reasonably, though mistakenly, rely on consent to enter a home. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990). The question is whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises[.]” Id. at 188 (cleaned up). The facts available at the time of the first entry support that conclusion. The officers knew that two 911 calls had reported a possible home invasion, that dispatch had identified Harrington’s address as the home in question, and that dispatch had confirmed the owner’s consent to clear what the officers believed was that house. Given those facts, a reasonable officer could conclude—though mistakenly—that he had consent to enter. But the facts looked very different by the time the officers entered again. Just before the second entry, they opened a bedroom door and found the Harringtons asleep in bed. Officer Lindsay whispered, “There’s somebody asleep on the bed. Did they give us the right address?” Officer Cano answered, “I don’t know.” At that point, the officers knew the house was not vacant, as they had expected, but occupied by a sleeping couple instead. And they knew enough to quest