Mauro Altamirano v. Attorney General United States of America

── Mauro Altamirano v. Attorney General United States of America ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Date: April 30, 2026 Category: General U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1735 MAURO ALTAMIRANO, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review from a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Immigration Judge Mirlande Tadal, No. A215-664-351 Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MASCOTT , Circuit Judges Submitted March 10, 2026; Decided April 30, 2026 _______________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. In 2019, an Immigration Judge (IJ), subsequently affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), entered a final order of removal for Petitioner Mauro Altamirano, on the grounds that he (1) was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and (2) had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT)—specifically, aggravated assault in violation of New Jersey law, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(2)—which rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (6)(A)(i); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). In January 2025, approximately six months after his CIMT conviction was vacated for ineffective assistance * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. of his criminal defense attorney, Altamirano filed an unsuccessful motion to reopen through new counsel, arguing that the vacatur rendered him no longer removable and newly eligible for cancellation of removal. Altamirano now petitions this Court, contending that the BIA (1) abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as time-barred without addressing his equitable tolling arguments, and (2) violated his due process rights in declining to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. Because the first claim is meritless and we lack jurisdiction to review the second, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss the petition in part. I. DISCUSSION1 A. Equitable Tolling A noncitizen has 90 days after the entry of his final order of removal to file a motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the agency can equitably toll the filing deadline if the noncitizen establishes “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citation modified). Contrary to Altamirano’s contention, the BIA did address whether his motion to reopen—filed nearly five years after the agency entered his final order of removal—should 1 The BIA had jurisdiction over Altamirano’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. We have jurisdiction over Altamirano’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard” and will not disturb its decision unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011). 2 be equitably tolled.2 It concluded such equitable tolling was not warranted, because Altamirano “did not file for post-conviction relief concerning his 2005 conviction until 2024, years after the conviction, and years after the [IJ’s] 2019 decision and our 2020 decision.” A.R. 4. Granted, the BIA erred to the extent it suggested that the clock started, for equitable tolling purposes, with Altamirano’s 2005 conviction, and it should