United States v. Undray Lowery
── United States v. Undray Lowery ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: April 29, 2026
Category: NEW
USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 1 of 5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-13332
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
UNDRAY LAMOND LOWERY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:25-cr-00208-RAH-KFP-1
____________________
Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Undray Lowery appeals his 120-month sentence after plead-
ing guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm and am-
munition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lowery argues on
USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 25-13332
appeal that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because
the district court clearly erred in finding that he possessed the fire-
arm in question in connection with another felony offense, and
thus, it erred in imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Lowery also argues that his sentence is substan-
tively unreasonable.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Cabezas-Mon-
tano, 949 F.3d 567, 605 (11th Cir. 2020). This standard “allows a
range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does
not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Riley, 995
F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). Under this standard,
“[w]e will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable ‘if, but
only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies out-
side the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the
case.’” Id. (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190).
“A district court does not have to give all the factors equal
weight, and it has discretion ‘to attach great weight to one factor
over others.’” United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir.
2025) (quoting United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2015)). In general, a district court need not state on the
record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors,
nor discuss those factors. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262,
USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 3 of 5
25-13332 Opinion of the Court 3
1265 (11th Cir. 2023). Rather, it is enough that the record reflects
that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and the par-
ties’ arguments. Id. “A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating
evidence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or
failed to consider the evidence.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th
1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations and citation omitted). Fi-
nally, “[a] sentence imposed well bel
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address as its source and its own type. #}