Mark Enterprises Car Company, LLC v. Ali

── Mark Enterprises Car Company, LLC v. Ali ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 28, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 28 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK ENTERPRISES CAR COMPANY, No. 25-2819 LLC, a Michigan limited liability company; D.C. No. DBA, Mark Mitsubishi; MARK 2:21-cv-01681-DLR ENTERPRISES CAR COMPANY II, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; DBA, MEMORANDUM* Mark Kia; MARK ENTERPRISES CAR COMPANY III, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; DBA, Mark Mazda; MARK DUBOWY; DYLAN MOUGEL; JOSHUA SPENCER, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. DILSHER ALI, Special Agent, in his individual capacity; JAMES COPE; REGINALD GRIGSBY, Defendants - Appellees, and JAMES CONNELL, UNKNOWN PARTIES, Defendants. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 15, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges. Mark Enterprises Car Company and its owner-managers Mark Dubowy, Dylan Mougel, and Joshua Spencer (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Special Agent Dilsher Ali and his supervisors in the Arizona Attorney General’s Office (collectively, “Defendants”) after three Mark Enterprises car dealerships were searched pursuant to a warrant. Plaintiffs alleged that the warrant authorized an overbroad search of digital devices, that Ali deceived the judge who issued the warrant, and that the supervisors failed to monitor Ali properly. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and reviewing de novo, Williams v. City of Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 642 (9th Cir. 2024), we affirm. 1. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62- 63 (2018) (cleaned up). “This demanding standard protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 63 (cleaned up). “[T]he fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the 2 25-2819 officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012). Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that qualified immunity does not apply because Ali deceived the judge who issued the warrant and the warrant was “so facially deficient” that Ali could not “reasonably presume it to be valid.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). We reject both arguments. a. To establish judicial deception, Plaintiffs must show that Ali “deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause.” Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Misrepresentations or omissions are not material if “the affidavit, once corrected and supplemented, establishes probable cause.” Id. at 1224. Plaintiffs argue that Ali’s affidavit falsely suggested that Lobos and F-150s “are different vehicles and not visually and functionally identical in every material respect”; that Lobos “do[] not meet U.S. safety and emissions standards”; that Lobos and