Diaz-Jimenez v. Blanche

── Diaz-Jimenez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ANA MARIA DIAZ-JIMENEZ; E.S.D., No. 22-1785 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A209-433-005 A209-433-006 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 23, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SCARSI, District Judge.*** Ana Maria Diaz-Jimenez and her minor daughter, both natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Appeals dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review the Board’s decision and those parts of the immigration judge’s decision that the Board expressly adopted. Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, including its findings about a persecutor’s actual motive. Rodriguez- Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023). We review de novo the agency’s legal conclusions, including whether a persecutor’s motives meet the nexus standard. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Umana-Escobar, 69 F.4th at 552. 1. The Board did not err in determining that Diaz-Jimenez did not establish a nexus between the harm she suffered, or fears, and a protected ground. For asylum, the petitioner must show that a protected ground will be “at least one central reason,” and for withholding of removal, “a reason,” for the feared harm. Barajas- Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), (C). Diaz-Jimenez argues that she was singled out for persecution because of her family membership. Even if we were to assume that Diaz-Jimenez’s family membership is a “particular social group” such that it qualifies as a protected 2 22-1785 ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the gang members who held Diaz-Jimenez and her family hostage in her house and beat and threatened her former partner did so in an effort to “flee capture by the police and enrich themselves,” not because of family membership. A “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the record contains no evidence that the gang members harbored any animus towards her family and instead shows that they were engaged only in generalized criminality, Diaz- Jimenez has not established a nexus to her proposed social group. See