Miguel v. Blanche

── Miguel v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MINGIEDI FAMILIA MIGUEL; D.P.M.; No. 24-6451 M.P.M.; A.M.P.; ARLETH MAVINGA Agency Nos. PEDRO MIGUEL, A246-768-480 A246-768-476 Petitioners, A246-768-496 A246-768-497 v. A246-768-498 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Seattle, Washington Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Mingiedi Familia Miguel (“Petitioner”) and his family (collectively, “Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition. Where, as here, “the BIA ‘adopts and affirms’ the IJ’s decision and provides its own analysis,” “[w]e review both the IJ and the BIA decisions.” Chmukh v. Garland, 124 F.4th 670, 674 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1224, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 2021)). When reviewing the agency’s persecution determination, we “review the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—for substantial evidence.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851 (2026). Under the substantial-evidence standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 850 (quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)). 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on past persecution. To establish eligibility for asylum, Petitioners must “demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). “Proving past persecution requires the petitioner to show, among 1 Miguel is the lead petitioner. His wife Arleth Mavinga Pedro Miguel and their three children A.M.P., D.P.M., and M.P.M. are seeking relief through him. 2 24-6451 other elements, that ‘his treatment rises to the level of persecution.’” Id. at 1060 (quoting Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)). The record supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that the harms Petitioner experienced do not constitute past persecution. First, while Petitioner testified to developing high blood pressure, stomach ulcers, and weight loss after escaping a police shooting at a political demonstration he helped organize, Petitioner did not allege that he or his family were “subject to ‘significant physical violence,’” or “suffered serious injuries that required medical treatment.” See id. at 1061 (citation omitted).