Keenan Wilkins v. Jeff MacOmber

── Keenan Wilkins v. Jeff MacOmber ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KEENAN G. WILKINS, No. 23-15934 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00475-TLN-DMC v. JEFF MACOMBER, Warden; KELLY MEMORANDUM* HARRINGTON, Warden; TIMOTHY M. LOCKWOOD; OREL DAVID; R. STEWART; B. MOORE; R. RAMIREZ; THERESA GIANNELLI, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 27, 2026** Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. California state prisoner Keenan G. Wilkins appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and screening dismissal in Wilkins’s action under 42 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) alleging claims arising from his incarceration at California State Prison-Sacramento. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. I. Moot Claims Dismissed Because Wilkins was transferred from the Sacramento prison in 2016, his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, including his RLUIPA claims, became moot. See Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a claim for injunctive relief would be moot following prisoner’s transfer if he “did not demonstrate ‘a reasonable expectation that he [would be] . . . subjected again’” to the challenged policy (citation omitted)); Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the same is true for claims seeking declaratory relief); see also Al Saud v. Days, 50 F.4th 705, 709 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Only injunctive relief, not monetary damages, is available pursuant to RLUIPA[.]”). II. Additional Dismissed Claims The district court properly dismissed Wilkins’s Fourth Amendment claim, alleging that defendants violated his right to privacy by housing him in a double cell without curtains, because he failed to allege facts rising to the level of a constitutional violation. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that “incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily 2 privacy,” but that prison policies may constitutionally impinge on this right if they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” (citation omitted)); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding, in the context of a claim alleging an unreasonable search, that prisoners have no Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their cells). The district court properly dismissed Wilkins’s claims of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 because he failed to allege facts showing that defendants conspired together. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A claim under [§ 1985] must allege facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.”; “A claim can be stat