United States v. Tristan Grant

── United States v. Tristan Grant ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30071 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:19-cr-03-RRB-MMS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* TRISTAN JAMAL GRANT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 20, 2024 Anchorage, Alaska Submission Withdrawn July 23, 2024 Resubmitted April 23, 2026 Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Tristan Grant appeals his convictions for sex trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (2); 2251(a), (e); 1594(c), and for being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  1. Grant first challenges his convictions on due process grounds, arguing that he was denied the right to trial by an impartial tribunal because the district court prejudged his guilt. As evidence, he points to the judge’s statements that he had begun work on his findings before the trial’s conclusion and to the minimal time it took for the judge to produce those findings after trial ended. Because he did not raise this objection before the district court, we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We conclude that there was no due process violation. Due process “entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal.” Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). “As long as a judge is capable of refining his views” such that his mind is not “‘irrevocably closed’ on the issues as they arise in the context of the specific case,” the judge is impartial enough to satisfy the demands of due process. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1476–77 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Grant has not shown that the judge’s mind was irrevocably closed to his arguments. Even if the judge began to draw conclusions during the trial—as drafting findings of fact before the end of trial would suggest—nothing in the record indicates that he would not have revised those conclusions had Grant presented credible evidence to call the government’s case into question. A judge may form preliminary 2 yet revisable judgments prior to trial’s completion. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (stating that a judge’s “knowledge and the opinion it produced” do not improperly bias a judge when they are “properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings”). And nothing about the judge’s efficiency undermined the integrity of the court so as to violate due process by the appearance of partiality. Cf. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he adjudicator’s pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings may create an appearance of partiality that violates due process . . . .” (first emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 2. Next, Grant argues that the district court denied him the right to a jury