Dickinson v. Trump

── Dickinson v. Trump ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 27, 2026 Category: General FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JACK DICKINSON, also known as the No. 26-1609 Portland Chicken; LAURIE ECKMAN; D.C. No. RICHARD ECKMAN; HUGO RIOS; 3:25-cv-02170-SI MASON LAKE, on behalf of themselves District of Oregon, and those similarly situated, Portland Plaintiffs - Appellees, ORDER v. DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, in his official capacity; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in her official capacity; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Defendants - Appellants. Before: Kenneth K. Lee, Ana de Alba, and Eric C. Tung, Circuit Judges. LEE, Circuit Judge: The First Amendment enshrines the right of the people to peacefully protest our government’s policies. But the First Amendment does not protect vandalism, criminal trespass, or obstruction of law enforcement. Such unlawful acts, however, have been commonplace around the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) building in Portland over the past year. Numerous provocateurs—many wielding bats, shields, and strobe lights that disrupt vision—have hurled bricks, smashed security cameras, and blocked the driveway to prevent ICE cars from entering or exiting the building. In response, the government has used tear gas, pepper balls, and other non-lethal munitions to disperse the crowd. Five plaintiffs sued the government, alleging that they are peaceful protesters who have been injured as a result of the crowd-control tactics. But they do not contend that they are collateral casualties caught in the crossfire—they claim that the government specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The district court preliminarily enjoined the government from using non-lethal crowd-control munitions unless someone “poses an imminent threat of physical harm” to law enforcement or other persons. We grant the government’s request to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal because it has made a substantial showing that it will likely succeed on the merits of the First Amendment retaliation claim. The plaintiffs have not shown that the agents had the subjective intent to retaliate or that the government has an unwritten policy targeting them. Much of the evidence shows the government trying to clear the entrance to the ICE facility in the face of unrest and an unruly crowd. And while some individual incidents might indicate an arguably disproportionate use of force, they alone do not amount to an unwritten policy of retaliation. In any event, the district court’s injunction is too broad. Under the injunction, 2 26-1609 the government cannot use common crowd-control tactics even if people vandalize federal property or block the entrance to the building to thwart law enforcement. But such unlawful activities are not protected by the First Amendment, and thus the district court erred in handcuffing the government’s ability to counter such illegal behavior. Finally, the district court acted beyond its authority in ordering a redesign of the ICE agents’ uniforms so that they have more “conspicuous and unique identifying markings.” Federal courts are not the couture of law enforcement officers. Because the government has made a strong showing that it will likely succeed on the merits and has satisfied the other stay factors, we stay the district court’s preliminary injunction.