Connex Credit Union v. Madgic

── Connex Credit Union v. Madgic ── Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut Date: April 28, 2026 Author: Mullins Category: General ************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Connex Credit Union v. Madgic CONNEX CREDIT UNION v. LYNANNE MADGIC ET AL. (SC 21171) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff credit union sought to recover damages from the defendants for a deficiency balance stemming from their default on a retail installment contract and security agreement for the purchase of a motor vehicle, which the plaintiff had repossessed and sold following the defendants’ default. The defendants also sought to recover damages from the plaintiff in a two count counterclaim under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (§ 42a- 9-675) and the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA) (§ 36a-785), alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to provide the defendants with adequate notice under those statutes before and after repossession and sale. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the defendants’ counterclaim, concluding that §§ 42a-9-625 and 36a-785 are penal statutes subject to the one year limitation period set forth in the statute of limitations (§ 52-585) governing actions “for any forfeiture upon any penal statute” and that the defendants’ claims under §§ 42a-9-625 and 36a-785 were therefore time barred because they had accrued more than one year before the defendants filed their counterclaim. The trial court also denied the defendants’ motion for class certification with respect to their counterclaim on the same ground. On appeal from the granting of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the defendants claimed that the trial court had improperly applied the one year limitation period in § 52-585 to their counterclaim and, instead, should have applied either the four year limitation period set forth in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 42a-2-725) governing breach of sales contracts or the three year statutory (§ 52-577) limitation period governing tort actions. Held: The trial court having improperly applied the one year limitation period in § 52-585 to the defendants’ counterclaim under both article 9 of the UCC and RISFA, that court also improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s ruling on that motion and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because § 42a-9-625 of article 9 of the UCC is not a penal statute but, rather, a remedial statute, insofar as it recognizes a private right of act