Hill v. Diaz

── Hill v. Diaz ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 24, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIAN T. HILL, No. 24-5189 D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08989-MWF-JC Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* RALPH DIAZ; JIM BONNIFIELD; B. LAYES; JOSIE GASTELO; L. WARREN; M. VOONG; B. NUNEZ; KOZAR; J. CHAVEZ; J. HERNANDEZ; V. CORREA; T. SCOTT; VEGA; G. CASTILLO; GARCIA; TALLEY; J. DAVIDSON; F. MOSS; D. P. IRWIN; A. STRAND; R. VALENCIA; D. YOUNG; B. ESCOBAR; K. MCCLATCHEY; H. BLAGG; M. AYON; J. STERKLE; R. GONZALEZ; D. MCALLISTER; J. STECK; D. SAMUEL; CONNIE GIPSON; K. J. ALLEN, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 22, 2026** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges. California state prisoner Brian T. Hill appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his participation in and removal from a prison’s religious diet program. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hill’s action because Hill failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 2024) (“An inmate asserting a Free Exercise claim must first show that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief that was impinged by government action.”); Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (a supervisory official is liable under § 1983 if “there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and 2 24-5189 internal quotation marks omitted)); Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which” the plaintiff complains (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hill’s motions for entry of default and default judgment because defendants timely filed a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that default can be entered against a party only where that party “has failed to