Perkins v. United States Department of Agriculture

── Perkins v. United States Department of Agriculture ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 24, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SILKIE PERKINS, No. 25-2489 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-08113-SMM v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; BROOKE L. ROLLINS, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; TOM SCHULTZ, Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 3, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Appellant Silkie Perkins challenges the United States Forest Service’s decision to cancel her term grazing permit. This permit gave Appellant authorization * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. to graze cattle on the Antelope Allotment, a section of National Forest System lands, subject to certain terms and conditions set forth in allotment management plans and annual operating instructions. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a), (d). Under her 2021 Annual Operating Instructions (AOI), Appellant was instructed to remove her cattle from the allotment by April 30, 2021. After this date, however, the Forest Service uncovered evidence of unauthorized grazing by cattle bearing the brands of Appellant and her son on the Antelope Allotment and on the nearby Jerome Allotment. The Forest Service consequently canceled the permit on the grounds that Appellant was either directly involved in unauthorized grazing, or that unauthorized grazing by her son’s cattle could be attributed to her. Appellant filed a complaint under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. On appeal, Appellant argues that the Forest Service’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law. 1. As a threshold matter, the appeal is not moot even though Appellant’s permit expired by its own terms on December 31, 2025. The Supreme Court has held that a case will only become moot “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 295 (2023) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). But a “case remains live ‘[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation.’” MOAC Mall 2 25-2489 Holdings, 598 U.S. at 295 (quoting Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172). In deciding mootness, we have held that a controversy remains live if “effective relief may still be available to counteract the effects of the violation.” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Noh v. INS, 248 F.3d 938, 940 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an alien’s petition for review was not moot even though his visa had already expired because “federal regulations permit a student visa holder to stay beyond his visa’s expiration date to continue his education”). Appellant holds a concrete interest in the outcome of this appeal. Under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(1), “the holder of the expiring permi