Gardner v. Rodriguez

── Gardner v. Rodriguez ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 24, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PENNY GARDNER, formerly known as No. 24-2418 Penny Rodriguez, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00144-TOR Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* ISRAEL RODRIGUEZ; STATE OF WASHINGTON, Acting through and doing business as The Washington Health Care Authority, Defendants - Appellees. PENNY GARDNER, No. 24-2760 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00144-TOR v. ISRAEL RODRIGUEZ, Defendant - Appellant, and STATE OF WASHINGTON, Defendant. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff Penny Gardner brought this action for damages against the State of Washington and eight state agencies (collectively, “State Defendants”), as well as Israel Rodriguez. Gardner asserted against State Defendants federal and state constitutional due process and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, and various state law claims. Gardner also asserted state law claims against Rodriguez. Gardner appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of State Defendants.1 Rodriguez cross-appeals the district court’s decision to remand Gardner’s state law claims against him to state court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 On appeal, Gardner challenges only the viability of her Section 1983 claim, the merits of her federal due process and equal protection claims, and remand of her state law outrage claim against State Defendants. Gardner does not raise any arguments as to Sections 1985(3) or 1986, her state constitutional claims, or her other state law claims against State Defendants. Accordingly, Gardner has waived these issues. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transport. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]ssues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”). 2 24-2418  “We review the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Feng, 935 F.3d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). We review the district court’s decision to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for an abuse of discretion. Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). 1. The district court did not err in dismissing Gardner’s Section 1983 claim because State Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. The plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who violates a right secured by t