United States v. Jones

── United States v. Jones ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: April 24, 2026 Category: General UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-422 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:21-cr-00004-TMB-MMS-1 District of Alaska, v. Juneau DUSTIN OLIVER JONES, ORDER Defendant - Appellant. Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. The memorandum disposition filed on June 12, 2024 is amended, and the amended memorandum disposition is filed concurrently with this order. The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED.  NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-422 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:21-cr-00004-TMB-MMS-1 v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM* DUSTIN OLIVER JONES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 20, 2024 Anchorage, Alaska Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Dustin Jones appeals his convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1. Jones first challenges the lawfulness of his convictions on the theory that * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. certain evidence of drug and firearm possession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. None of his Fourth Amendment arguments withstands scrutiny. As a threshold matter, we conclude that Jones’s boat was a vehicle, not a home, for Fourth Amendment purposes. In conducting this inquiry, we look to whether the boat was: (1) “readily mobile” such that “it could readily have been moved beyond the reach of the police”; (2) “subject to extensive regulation and inspection”; and (3) “the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (citation omitted). Although the boat was anchored, it was still readily mobile—the boat was located near open waterways, and an anchor could be raised in less time than it would take for officers to obtain a warrant. See United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 673 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a boat’s being on “open waters on a large lake” and not “permanently moored” weighed in favor of it being a vehicle). It appears that the boat was not subject to inspection by the State when it was not in operation, see Alaska Stat. Ann. § 16.05.480, but because it was not permanently moored or connected to utilities, an objective observer would likely believe that Jones’s boat was being used as a vehicle, not a residence, see Albers, 136 F.3d at 673 n.3; Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3.